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This year’s sharp oil price increases have led
to concerns about a threat to continued economic
prosperity, and with good reason. Rising oil prices
have preceded eight of the nine post-World War II
recessions. But rising oil prices do not seem to be
having much effect on U.S. economic growth this
year. Are we waiting for the other shoe to drop,
hoping oil prices will fall, or has there been a
change in the relationship between oil prices and
the economy?
Most of us have become accustomed to think-
ing of supply shocks originating in the Middle East
as being the primary impetus to rising oil prices.
OPEC meetings have helped reinforce this think-
ing. And much of the analysis about the possible
economic effects of rising oil prices shares this
conventional wisdom.
But the oil price increases occurring in 2000
owe more to growing world demand fostered by
a robust world economy than to a supply shock.
Consequently, U.S. economic activity has been
and should remain much less responsive to rising
oil prices than the conventional wisdom might
have us expect. The unconventional wisdom sug-
The Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) raised its
federal funds interest rate target by 175 basis points between June 1999 and
June 2000. From June 2000 to this writing (in mid-October), monetary policy
has been on hold.
As is often the case, the FOMC’s actions have been controversial. Some
analysts, citing unprecedented stock market valuations and a historically low
unemployment rate, have claimed that an increase in the funds rate was long
overdue.
1 Others have questioned the need for any policy tightening at all,
arguing that the old rules no longer apply—that greater competition, the
globalization of product and capital markets, and the spread of new tech-
nologies have made traditional measures of labor-market slack and stock
market overvaluation obsolete. Evidence that U.S. productivity growth has
been strongly increasing has put the first group of analysts on the defensive,
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(Continued on page 6)gests that rising energy prices are more
evidence of a robust economy than a
threat to it. That bodes well for the sus-
tainability of the current economic
expansion in the United States and the
Southwest, as well as for the continued
recovery of the oil and gas industry.
The Upward Pressure 
on Oil Prices
Since hitting a low around $10 per
barrel for West Texas Intermediate crude
(WTI) in early 1999, oil prices have risen
sharply (Chart 1). This increase has
occurred because the world capacity to
supply oil has not kept pace with the
growth of oil demand spurred by a re-
surgent world economy. A short supply
of oil tankers, rising shipping rates and
low inventories of refined product and
crude oil have added upward pressure to
spot crude oil prices.
As shown in Chart 2, world oil de-
mand generally rose from 1993 through
2000, as is evident in the increase in both
quantity and price. The decrease in price
and increase in quantity in 1998 suggest
increased supply in that year, which was
followed by a supply reduction in 1999.
In 2000, the data suggest a sharp rise in
world oil demand with both price and
quantity increasing dramatically.
Oil consumption among the mem-
ber countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) grew steadily during the
1990s (Chart 3). Over the past two years,
U.S. oil consumption grew moderately as
the economy accelerated because the
shift to the New Economy improved
energy efficiency. In contrast, oil con-
sumption in the non-OECD countries
increased dramatically over the past few
years. The strongest growth in demand
seems to be taking place in the industri-
alizing Asian countries, such as China
and Korea, that are experiencing a re-
surgence in economic activity.
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In 2000, the data
suggest a sharp rise
in world oil demand
with both price and
quantity increasing
dramatically.
Real Oil Prices Remain Strong
Real WTI price
(September 2000 dollars per barrel)
Chart 1
NOTES: Data are annual for 1970–84, monthly for 1985–2000. Oil prices are deflated using Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index.
SOURCE: Wall Street Journal.











Oil Demand Rises 
Sharply in 2000
Real WTI price
(September 2000 dollars* per barrel)
Chart 2
* Seasonally adjusted.
NOTE: Oil prices are deflated using Bureau of Labor Statistics
Consumer Price Index.
SOURCES: Wall Street Journal; Energy Information
Administration.



















’98Throughout much of the 1990s, how-
ever, oil and natural gas prices were too
low to stimulate additions to capacity.
World capacity to supply oil and natural
gas did not keep pace with growing con-
sumption. In addition, many tankers
were scrapped in the 1990s when weak
demand, low shipping rates and increas-
ing environmental regulation put a lot of
pressure on the tanker industry.
As rising world oil consumption has
pushed OPEC closer to full capacity
(Chart 4 ), the cartel has raised oil prices.
The coordination of production among
OPEC members and some nonmember
countries probably makes world oil pro-
duction less responsive to price move-
ments during periods of rising demand
and high capacity utilization. Rising de-
mand would have boosted world oil
prices, but probably by less than if a com-
petitive industry produced the world’s oil.
Several other factors have contributed
to upward pressure on oil prices. With
tankers in short supply and shipping
rates substantially higher, spot prices are
climbing in countries to which tankers
deliver crude oil. The high demand for
tankers has been exacerbated by the
relatively low inventories of crude oil
and product in oil-importing countries,
such as the United States. In addition,
high natural gas prices have kept oil
demand strong.
Where Are Oil Prices Headed?
As of this writing in late October, the
spot and futures markets suggest that the
price of oil will begin falling after reach-
ing $35 per barrel for WTI in November
(Chart 5). Market fundamentals suggest
that most of the near-term risks are on
the upside of the price path forecast by
the futures market.
Since oil prices began rising in
March 1999, the futures market has con-
sistently forecast lower prices for crude
oil than eventually materialized in the
spot market (Chart 6 ). The market’s con-
sistent underforecasting of oil prices
could reflect a failure to recognize the
role that strong economic activity has
played in stimulating demand and boost-
ing world oil prices. Instead, the market
seems to be interpreting strong oil prices
as being the result of reversible shocks
to the world oil supply undertaken by 
an unstable cartel and temporary factors
that have boosted demand. If the market
has failed to understand how economic
growth has stimulated world oil demand,
futures prices are likely to yield faulty pre-
dictions. Additions to world oil capacity
and to the fleet of tankers to ship that oil
could be slow in coming, particularly if
strong prices are viewed as temporary.
Natural Gas Prices
During mid-October, the wellhead
price of natural gas was $5.50 per million
Btu—more than twice what it had been
a year earlier and the highest real natural
gas price in 15 years. Adjusted for infla-
tion, natural gas prices reached compa-
rable heights in the early 1980s. High oil
prices have prompted fuel switching away
from oil to natural gas, and much hotter
than normal summer weather in some areas
of the United States led to increased de-
mand for cooling. Both factors reduced
inventories of natural gas and pushed its
price upward. The futures market suggests
moderate declines in natural gas prices
over the coming years, but again the
market forecast may be unreliable.
Implications for 
U.S. Economic Activity
In assessing the effect of rising oil
prices on economic activity, the conven-
tional wisdom has been to attribute rising
oil prices to supply shocks. For example,
Brown and Yücel (2000) estimate each
$10-per-barrel increase in the oil price
will reduce U.S. GDP growth by 0.3 per-
centage points and boost the GDP defla-
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World Oil Consumption,
1975–2000
Million barrels per day
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Chart 5
SOURCE: Wall Street Journal.














WTI spot pricetor by 0.3 percent during the first year.
The OECD estimates are a 0.2 percent-
age point reduction in U.S. GDP and a
0.4 percent increase in consumer prices
in the first year.
As Brown and Yücel found, the U.S.
economy is about half as sensitive to ris-
ing oil prices resulting from an oil shock
as it was in the early 1980s, and prices
have risen to about half what they were
at that time. The economy’s reduced sen-
sitivity can be attributed to lower energy
use per unit of GDP, as well as the fact
that the economy never fully adjusted to
the oil price declines of 1997 and 1998.
The conduct of monetary policy may
also have weakened the link between
oil-price movements and core inflation
since the mid-1980s.
But, as noted previously, rising oil
and natural gas prices do not seem to be
hurting U.S. economic growth as much
as the conventional wisdom might sug-
gest. The principal reason is that the cur-
rent rise in oil and natural gas prices is
more the result of strong world eco-
nomic activity than a shock to world 
oil supplies. Consequently, rising energy
prices would have less effect on eco-
nomic activity—restraining only slightly
what would otherwise be extremely strong
growth. For example, Americans are pay-
ing higher prices for gasoline to get to
work, but they have jobs to go to and
greater income to buy the gasoline.
For a more complete analogy, con-
sider the airline industry. We know that
rising fuel costs hurt the airline industry,
but we also know that the industry has
been helped considerably by the strong
demand for transportation services that
came with a robust economy. Strong de-
mand is allowing airlines to boost fares
and pass the increased fuel cost forward
to the passengers while maintaining high
load factors. All things considered, the
airline industry is better off with strong
demand, higher fares and higher fuel
costs than it is with weak demand, low
fares and low fuel costs.
This is not to argue that rising energy
prices help the U.S. economy. In fact,
strong energy prices are likely to reduce
U.S. GDP below the baseline trajectory
that analysts might have expected if oil
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Rising oil and
natural gas prices
do not seem to 
be hurting U.S.
economic growth





Price Index Is Rising
12-month percent change
Chart 7
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2000 1999 1998 1997 1996with a robust economy, looking at core
measures of inflation, which exclude
energy prices, may not be appropriate
for assessing the overall inflationary
pressures in the economy. Rising energy
prices could be evidence of inflationary
pressure in a strong economy that is
beginning to hit supply constraints in
basic commodities. As shown in Chart 7,
the overall Consumer Price Index (CPI)
has been increasing more rapidly over
the past few years than the core CPI.
Much of the difference is rising energy
prices.
Implications for Energy-Exporting
States in the Southwest
Rising oil and natural gas prices con-
tinue to stimulate a recovery in the oil and
gas extraction industry in the Southwest.
Since early 1999, rig counts have been
rising in Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico and
Oklahoma as well as the United States as
a whole (Chart 8). Rig counts in Texas
and the nation have grown at about the
same rate. Strong growth in drilling for
natural gas has stimulated greater gains
in New Mexico. Falling energy prices hurt
drilling in Louisiana less than in Texas,
and Louisiana continues to maintain an
edge during the recovery.
The recovery of employment in oil
and gas extraction has been more
muted, in part because firms are having
trouble finding employees who are will-
ing to work in the volatile industry. As
with drilling activity, the growth of em-
ployment in oil and gas extraction has
been strongest in New Mexico (Chart 9).
Employment in oil and gas extraction is
growing at a slower pace in Louisiana,
Texas and Oklahoma.
Because Louisiana, New Mexico, Okla-
homa and Texas are net exporters of
crude oil and natural gas, their econo-
mies are stimulated by rising oil and 
natural gas prices. Nevertheless, the in-
creased diversification of their econo-
mies and the presence of industries—
such as petrochemicals—that are hurt 
by rising energy prices have substan-
tially reduced these states’ sensitivity to
movements in oil and natural gas prices.
And because the rise in energy prices is
associated with a strong national econ-
omy, the non-energy industries in the
Southwest are likely to continue to see
strong demand associated with a robust
economy. Consequently, the net effects
of rising energy prices should remain
largely favorable for the energy-export-
ing states in the Southwest.
—Stephen P. A. Brown
Brown is Director of Energy Economics 
and Microeconomic Policy Analysis at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Reference
Brown, Stephen P. A., and Mine K. Yücel (2000), “Oil Prices 
and the Economy,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest
Economy, Issue 4, July/August, 1–6.
prices had not increased and all other
factors had remained constant. For ex-
ample, if oil prices remain close to the
current spot price of $35 per barrel,
annualized U.S. real GDP could be about
0.2 percent to 0.5 percent lower in the
final quarter of 2002 than would occur 
if oil prices fell to the $25 per barrel that
is forecast by the futures market. Against 
a backdrop of strong economic growth,
however, the slowing effects of rising oil
prices will not be very visible.
With the strength in energy prices
coming from the demand associated
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Rig Counts on the Rise































Share of total United States
Oil and Gas Extraction Employment Recovering Only Moderately
Index, January 1997 = 100*
Chart 9
* Seasonally adjusted.
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Louisianabecause most economists recognize that
rising productivity growth can prevent
tight labor markets from putting upward
pressure on inflation and that high trend
productivity growth can justify high
stock market valuations (Koenig 2000).
The main point of this article is that
one doesn’t need to believe in stock
market bubbles or a stable inflation–
unemployment trade-off to understand
the motivation for the Fed’s latest round
of tightening. In particular, recent policy
actions have been entirely consistent
with the FOMC’s past response, under
Alan Greenspan’s leadership, to direct
signs of building inflationary pressure in
product markets. This consistency will
be reassuring to those who feel that the
Greenspan Fed has generally done a
good job of holding inflation in check
without unduly damping real growth. A
secondary goal is to provide some
insight on the likely course of real eco-
nomic activity in coming quarters, as the
interest-rate increases of the past 18
months begin to bite.
Some Perspective on Inflation
Chart 1 shows the path of inflation
from January 1998 to the present, as
measured by the chain price index 
for personal consumption expenditures.
The strong upward trend from Decem-
ber 1998 onward is prima-facie evidence
that over this period demand was out-
stripping supply and, hence, that a
tightening of monetary policy was appro-
priate.
2 To quote Robert McTeer, presi-
dent of the Dallas Fed: “I didn’t think 
we should shoot inflation while it is try-
ing to surrender. But, more recently, it’s
been showing signs of resisting arrest”
(McTeer 2000).
Should the Fed have acted sooner 
or more vigorously? Chart 2 puts the re-
cent inflation increases in perspective by
extending the plot displayed in Chart 1
backward to 1990. The revised plot
makes it clear that recent increases have
only brought inflation back to where it
was in 1996, before the Asian economic
crisis. With the collapse of the Asian
economies, resources around the world
that had been devoted to meeting the
needs of consumers overseas suddenly
became available to people in the United
States. In other words, from the U.S. per-
spective, the Asian economic crisis
amounted to a favorable supply shock. 
It gave U.S. businesses and consumers
an opportunity to purchase imports and
import substitutes at bargain-basement
prices.
Given the rapidity with which events
unfolded, the Fed could hardly have
avoided—even if it had desired to do
so—the dip in inflation that began in
1997 and extended into 1998. And given
the uncertainty surrounding recovery of
the Asian economies during much of
1999, it is also unrealistic to expect that
the Fed could have acted quickly
enough to prevent an inflation rebound
over the past year. Indeed, according 
to some theories of optimal monetary
policy, a temporary decline in inflation 
is exactly what one would want to see 
in response to a shock like the Asian
downturn and recovery (Koenig 1995).
In short, the inflation genie is still in
its bottle. It remains to be seen whether
the policy actions taken during the sec-
ond half of 1999 and the first half of 
2000 will keep it there.
Monetary Policy on Target
Given the Federal Reserve’s success
in engineering a soft landing for the
economy in 1994–95 and its near suc-
cess in achieving a soft landing in 1990,
it is reassuring that the Fed’s latest round
of tightening is consistent with its past
behavior.
3 In particular, recent increases
in the federal funds rate bear the same
Monetary Policy: On the Right Track?
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of inflation pressure in product markets
as have past changes. This implies that
the motivation for the latest funds-rate
increases can be understood without 
reference to tight labor markets, rising
wages or stock market bubbles.
Chart 3 displays the 12-month change
in the federal funds rate along with each
of four variables measuring supply–
demand imbalance or emerging inflation-
ary pressure in product markets. The
charts show that during 1999 we saw
accelerating unfilled orders and inflation
expectations, along with slower supplier
deliveries and rising rates of capacity 
utilization. Over the period during which
Alan Greenspan has chaired the FOMC,
it is apparent that the Federal Reserve
has typically responded to such signs 
of excess demand by tightening mone-
tary policy.
Chart 4 shows actual and expected
changes in the federal funds rate, where
the expected changes are from a regres-
sion of the funds rate on the excess-
demand indicators displayed in Chart 3.
(For details, see the box titled “Under-
standing Federal Funds Rate Changes.”)
Chart 4 suggests that as of the third quar-
ter of 2000, the funds rate was within 
25 basis points of where one would have
expected it to be, given the past be-
havior of the Greenspan Fed. There is 
no indication that the FOMC has acted
any more or less aggressively lately than
in the past.
Likely Future Impact of 
Recent Policy Moves
How much slowing of growth in
economic activity can we expect as a
result of policy moves taken to date?
Recent research suggests that the junk-
bond spread—the yield on high-yield
bonds less the yield on AAA-rated cor-
porate bonds—is a good long-leading
indicator of movements in economic
activity (Gertler and Lown 1999). Other
useful long-leading indicators are the
real federal funds rate (the federal funds
rate less professional forecasters’ one-
year inflation expectations) and the in-
flation-adjusted growth rate of the M2
money stock.
Intuitively, the junk-bond spread is 
a measure of the risk that marginal bor-
rowers will default on their loans. Default
risk tends to increase as economic pros-
pects dim. The real federal funds rate is
a measure of the price banks must pay 
to obtain funds that can, in turn, be lent
out to households and businesses. It is
heavily influenced by FOMC decisions.
Inflation-adjusted M2 growth measures
changes in the quantity of liquid assets
held by the nonbank public. Variables
like stock prices and the slope of the
yield curve (the spread between long-
and short-term interest rates) have no
marginal predictive power for real activity
in the 1980s and 1990s in the presence of
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Unfilled Orders Expected Inflation
Supplier Deliveries Manufacturing Capacity Utilizationthe junk-bond spread, the real funds rate
and real M2 growth.
Chart 5 combines and summarizes
the information in real M2 growth, the
real federal funds rate and the junk-bond
spread. It shows the annualized six-
month growth rate of private nonfarm
employment along with the employment
growth rate one would have predicted
nine months earlier by observing the
three financial indicators. (Details are
provided in the box titled “Predicting
Employment Growth.”) The latest fore-
cast is based on M2, funds-rate, bond-
yield, inflation and inflation-expectations
data that were available in mid-October.
Annualized employment growth during
the first half of 2001 is predicted to be
0.3 percent—down from 2 percent actual
growth during the first six months of 2000
and from 1.5 percent growth over the six
months ending in September. Since most
analysts project 1 percent annual labor-
force growth, the forecast implies a small
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Long-Leading Indicators Predict a Further Slowing 
of Employment Growth
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The bottom line is
that policy actions





into a recession.increase in the unemployment rate dur-
ing the first half of next year.
4
The bottom line is that policy actions
taken to date appear likely to slow em-
ployment growth substantially but not
drive the economy into a recession.
Summary
The federal funds rate increases that
occurred during 1999 and 2000 can be
understood without reference to tight
labor markets and high stock prices—
traditional indicators of economic over-
heating that are of dubious relevance
when labor-productivity growth is high
and rising. In fact, the latest round of
monetary policy tightening was entirely
consistent with past Fed responses to
direct signs of demand–supply imbal-
ance and inflationary pressure in product
markets. This consistency is encourag-
ing, for it suggests that the Fed stands a
good chance—barring an unexpected
oil-supply disruption—of stabilizing in-
flation while maintaining growth in out-
put and employment.
—Evan F. Koenig
Koenig is vice president and senior
economist in the Research Department 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
Thanks to Charis Ward and Ricardo Llaudes for first-rate research
assistance.
1 For discussion of the roles of the stock market and unemployment rate
in policymaking, see Koenig (2000). Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and
Cecchetti et al. (2000) present sharply different views on the amount
of attention policymakers ought to give to stock prices.
2 Plots of core and median consumer price inflation display similar
trends, although the exact timing of the recent upward movement 
differs from one inflation measure to another.
3 The economy is said to experience a soft landing when demand growth
slows sufficiently to prevent a threatened increase in inflation and 
yet an outright recession is avoided. Many analysts feel that the 
U.S. economy was on track to a soft landing in 1990 had Iraq not
invaded Kuwait.
4 Consistent results are obtained when six-month changes in the unem-
ployment rate are regressed directly on the three financial indicators.
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Understanding Federal Funds Rate Changes
Chart 4 captures the relationship between the 12-month change in the federal funds rate (∆ ff ) and
four direct measures of demand–supply imbalance in product markets: the 12-month change in unfilled
orders (∆ uo), the National Association of Purchasing Management’s measure of lengthening supplier
delivery lags (napm), the level of manufacturing capacity utilization (capu) and the four-quarter change
in professional forecasters’ inflation expectations (∆ pie). The larger any of these four variables is, the
greater the increase in the federal funds rate tends to be. The exact relationship is as follows:
∆ ff = –32.2746 + .1219 ∆ uo + .0654 ∆ uo(–4) + .0093 napm + .0368 napm(–4)
(6.2140) (.0190) (.0247) (.0289) (.0223)
+ .1911 capu + .1709 capu(–4) + 1.3312 ∆ pie + .8883 ∆ pie(–4) – .6136 ∆ ff(–4)
(.0661) (.0604) (.1680) (.1480) (.1035)
Adjusted R
2 = .930 S.E. = .399 Sample: 1989:Q1–2000:Q3.
Standard errors of the coefficients are given in parentheses. The estimation methodology makes due
allowance for a moving-average error term.
Because many of the right-hand-side variables are contemporaneous with the left-hand-side
variable, the equation above is not directly useful for giving advance warning of Fed policy decisions.
However, the fact that the equation does a good job of explaining funds-rate changes after the fact
suggests that the variables to which policymakers respond in real time are highly correlated with
emerging imbalances in product markets, as subsequently evidenced by high rates of capacity utilization
and increases in unfilled orders, delivery lags and inflation expectations. The equation provides a means
for assessing whether recent policy decisions are in line or out of line with past Fed responses to
emerging imbalances.
Predicting Employment Growth
Chart 5 shows annualized six-month growth in private, nonfarm employment together with job-
growth predictions made nine months before the fact. The predictions come from a regression of
employment growth (∆ pemp) on lagged employment growth (∆ remp), the lagged level of the real 
federal funds rate (rff ), lagged real growth in the M2 money supply measure (∆ rm2) and the lagged
difference between the yields on so-called junk bonds and high-quality, AAA-rated corporate bonds
(spred). The data are quarterly. The results of this regression are as follows:
∆ pemp = 4.1069 + .3708 ∆ remp(–3) – .4965 rff(–3) + .0580 ∆ rm2(–3) – .4629 spred(–3)
(.5760) (.1093) (.1025) (.0425) (.1362)
Adjusted R
2 = .687 S.E. = .789 Sample: 1985:Q4–2000:Q3.
The six-month growth rates of employment and money that appear on the right-hand side of the
regression are calculated using real-time levels data from the third month of each quarter. (The depen-
dent variable is calculated similarly, except using revised data.) These data do not become available until
the first month of the subsequent quarter. All interest rates are measured as of the middle of this same
month. The real federal funds rate is obtained from the market funds rate by subtracting the one-year
inflation expectations of professional economists, as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia. To obtain real M2, nominal M2 data are deflated using the Consumer Price Index. The standard
errors of the estimated coefficients (appropriately adjusted for a moving-average error term) are given 
in parentheses.10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS   SOUTHWEST ECONOMY   NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2000
Beyond the Border
n December 1, Mexico’s first
nonruling party president in
more than seven decades
will take office. Vicente Fox Quesada, a
member of the center-right National
Action Party, will face a host of chal-
lenges in the areas of banking and
finance, worker and capital productivity,
and taxation.
Much has been made of Mexico’s
rapid growth since the so-called Tequila
Crisis of 1995. In the last five years, 
Mexican industrial production growth
has outstripped that of any other major
Western Hemisphere country, including
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United
States.
But the principal engine of this
growth has been exports. Mexican con-
sumption growth has significantly trailed
production growth. In addition, small
and medium-sized nonexporting firms
have seen far less expansion than the 
big exporters. The lags in domestic con-
sumption and in expansion by the smaller
nonexporting firms have similar roots.
The large export firms have access to
foreign credit, while Mexican consumers
and small to medium-sized producers must
rely on credit from Mexican banks—and
these banks have cut back on their lend-
ing. While bank loan activity has had 
its ups and downs since the Tequila Cri-
sis, the real value of bank loans has 
generally been down, especially since
1998 (Chart 1).
Vicente Fox has proposed financial
programs to address credit availability
for small to medium-sized firms. For one,
he suggests a Grameen-style bank to
provide credit to small borrowers. The
first Grameen bank, located in Bangla-
desh, represented a highly successful
approach to lending for very small busi-
ness operations. Fox developed his own
brand of Grameen banking in his home
state of Guanajuato and hopes to take
his operation national.
Although many Americans have
heard of Mexico’s high growth over the
last five years, fewer realize that Mexico
has experienced very little economic
expansion per person over the last two
decades. Between 1981 and 1999, total
Mexican GDP per capita grew only 6.8
percent—not per year, but over the en-
tire period. During the same time frame,
U.S. income per capita rose 48 percent.
To further complicate matters, Mexi-
can income distribution has become in-
creasingly uneven over the last 15 years.
Income disparity in Mexico exceeds that
of the United States as well as Ecuador,
El Salvador and Bolivia. Thus, Mexico’s
challenge is not only to raise real income
per capita but also to create opportuni-
ties so that its poorest share in the in-
crease. If that is not possible, political
pressures may militate against the very
measures Fox believes are most likely to
increase income per capita.
An important aspect of creating a
basis for growth in income per capita is
raising education levels. Compared with
industrial countries, some Asian tigers and
even Brazil and Chile, Mexico’s average
education level is low. Similar compari-
sons can be made with other social indi-
cators. Mexico’s infant mortality, for
example, is markedly higher than that in
Argentina and Chile, not to mention
Korea, France and the United States.
Fox believes he can make labor 
and capital more productive by investing 
in education and infrastructure and in-
creasing social spending. He wants to
broaden tax coverage by bringing Mex-
ico’s large informal sector into the tax-
paying fold. This would allow the gov-
ernment to increase spending without
further taxing the formal sector, which
currently bears the fiscal burden.
So far, Mexico’s new administration
looks as if it will emphasize govern-
ment’s relationship to the public more 
as a channel for investment in human
skills, capacities and infrastructure than
as a medium for income redistribution or
other populist measures.
—William C. Gruben
Gruben is vice president and director 
of the Center for Latin American Economics
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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The Mexican Economy Since the Tequila Crisis
Mexican Bank Lending Falls
(Real commercial bank loans to the private sector, deflated with CPI)
Index, 1994:1 = 100
Chart 1
















2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994urrent economic data suggest that the Texas econ-
omy is growing at a moderate pace. A pickup in
energy-related employment and solid demand for
services continue to add new jobs to the economy. Alterna-
tively, weakness in manufacturing employment and a very
tight labor market have attenuated overall job growth. The
September unemployment rate was 4.3 percent, up only
slightly from July’s 20-year low of 4.1 percent.
High oil and gas prices continue to stimulate growth in the
energy sector. The number of rigs drilling for oil and gas in
Texas increased to 364 in October, up 33 percent from the
beginning of the year. Employment in oil and gas extraction
has finally begun to pick up. Although it had been sluggish
due to difficulty in hiring workers who had other opportuni-
ties in more stable industries, employment in this sector has
grown 2.7 percent (annual rate) since January.
Employment in the private service-producing sector, which
makes up 60 percent of total employment, grew vigorously,
increasing at an annual rate of 3.6 percent year to date.
Employment growth in durable goods manufacturing, which
includes high-tech, has not fared as well. After increasing mod-
erately throughout the year, employment in this sector
dropped in September at an annualized rate of 0.2 percent. 
Recent changes in the Texas Leading Index suggest moder-
ated growth over the next six months. Both the U.S. and Texas
leading indexes have trended down recently. In Texas, de-
clines in new unemployment claims, the Texas Stock Index,
average weekly hours and the U.S. leading index outweighed
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July–September 2000
Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Texas Employment
Index, January 1997 = 100
Index, January 1999 = 100
U.S. and Texas Leading Indexes
Percent
.50 –.50 –.40 –.30 –.20 –.10 0 .10 .20 .30 .40
Average weekly hours –.01
Texas Stock Index –.39
New unemployment claims –.09
Well permits .16
Real oil price .17
U.S. leading index –.09
Texas value of the dollar .09
Net change in leading index –.16
Total Nonfarm Employment









































TEXAS EMPLOYMENT* TOTAL NONFARM EMPLOYMENT*
Texas Private New
Leading Index TIPI† total Mining Construction Manufacturing Government service-producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
9/00 125.9 130.8 148.8 566.7 1,089.6 1,570.8 6,111.5 9,487.4 1,905.9 748.4
8/00 126.4 131.2 148.4 564.6 1,089.7 1,557.5 6,093.1 9,453.3 1,903.6 747.6
7/00 126.6 131.0 148.5 563.0 1,090.0 1,550.1 6,074.0 9,425.6 1,902.6 743.6
6/00 126.1 130.1 149.3 562.1 1,088.1 1,563.3 6,048.6 9,411.4 1,906.1 740.7
5/00 125.8 129.0 148.8 560.3 1,086.1 1,583.4 6,038.0 9,416.6 1,911.7 743.4
4/00 126.9 128.4 148.6 563.0 1,083.9 1,556.3 6,030.3 9,382.1 1,906.5 742.6
3/00 127.9 128.4 149.0 558.0 1,089.0 1,553.0 6,025.3 9,374.3 1,900.7 739.8
2/00 126.7 128.0 148.2 551.9 1,086.7 1,546.9 5,993.3 9,327.0 1,898.1 738.3
1/00 125.8 128.2 148.1 551.4 1,084.3 1,545.1 5,978.7 9,307.6 1,894.1 738.0
12/99 126.4 128.2 145.7 541.2 1,078.2 1,543.3 5,949.7 9,258.1 1,903.6 734.1
11/99 124.6 128.2 145.4 537.4 1,077.1 1,535.2 5,926.3 9,221.4 1,906.0 734.5
10/99 124.3 127.5 145.2 533.4 1,077.8 1,534.3 5,908.0 9,198.7 1,904.2 734.0
* In thousands.  † Texas Industrial Production Index.
For more information on
employment data, see “Reassessing
Texas Employment Growth” (Southwest
Economy, July/August 1993). For TIPI,
see “The Texas Industrial Production
Index” (Dallas Fed Economic Review,
November 1989). For the Texas Leading
Index and its components, see “The
Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation”
(Dallas Fed Economic Review, July
1990). Online economic data and
articles are available on the Dallas Fed’s
Internet web site, www.dallasfed.org.
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